In imperfectly competitive markets firms with high costs produce positive output. The market's ability to minimize costs is also constrained by the fact that firms' costs are often private information. Mergers in such markets play a dual role. They reduce competition but they also generate an efficiency gain associated with the pooling of information. This paper shows that not only may costs be reduced as a result of merger, the price level may also decline and consumers may thus gain.
Introduction
This paper studies the welfare effects of horizontal mergers in a Cournot duopoly. In particular, I focus on the effect of a merger on consumer welfare through its impact on price. In general, there is a tension between the anticompetitive effects of a merger and efficiency gains. For example, a merged firm can rationalize production, i.e. re-allocate production from high-cost to low-cost plants. However, Farrell and Shapiro (1990) demonstrate that if a merger generates no synergies, defined as cost savings in addition to rationalization, it always raises price and reduces consumer welfare. Although Farrell and Shapiro consider a model with fixed costs, their result is easily generalized to include cost variability as long as information is complete. Since the price (consumer utility) after a merger is higher (lower) than the price (utility) before a merger for every cost contingency, the expected price (utility) must be higher (lower) also when cost varies over time.
In contrast, the present study shows that if firms' costs are private knowledge, a merger may decrease the expected market price, also without synergies. The difference between Farrell and Shapiro's and my results is due to our different models of the pre-merger situation. It is well-known that firms with low marginal costs produce more than firms with high marginal costs, a phenomenon we may call market-induced rationalization. The key point of the present paper is that the market induces less rationalization under incomplete than under complete information. When a firm has a high cost, it plans a small output. Under complete information, the competitors anticipate this and expand their output which, in turn, reduces residual demand to the high-cost firm. Consequently, a high-cost firm also tends to meet a low residual demand and is induced to reduce output even further. Such market induced rationalization cannot occur if costs are private knowledge and thus, mergers generate an extra efficiency gain in markets with asymmetric information, due to pooling of information.
The Model
Consider a static Cournot duopoly with homogenous goods. The inverse demand function is given by p = α − q 1 − q 2 . Each firm owns one plant, with constant returns to scale. The marginal cost in a plant i, denoted c i , is stochastic and distributed on [c L , c H ] with mean Ec = µ < α and variance var {c} = σ 2 . Costs are identically and independently distributed over plants. The main modelling assumptions, for example that costs are independently distributed and private knowledge, are discussed in a separate section after the results are presented.
Since firms know their own cost, but not their competitor's cost, the interaction must be analyzed as a game with incomplete information. In a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, firm i chooses a supply function q i (c i ), so as to maximize the expected profit,
given the supply function chosen by the competitor, q j (c j ). Standard calculations yield
To ensure that firms produce non-negative output in equilibrium, it is assumed that c H ≤ 2α/3 + µ/3. The duopoly price is
A merger gives the monopolist the opportunity to rationalize production. Given a total production, q, the monopolist allocates production between plants so as to minimize the production costs, c 1 q 1 (c) + c 2 q 2 (c). With constant returns to scale, the monopolist simply allocates all production to the plant with the lowest cost. Consequently, the monopolist's technology has constant returns to scale and is characterized by the stochastic marginal cost c ≡ min {c 1 , c 2 }, which is the so-called first-order statistic. The mean is denoted by µ and variance is denoted by σ 2 (see the Preliminaries of Appendix A). The merger does not generate any synergies, defined as cost savings in addition to rationalization. The monopoly chooses the supply function q m (c) so as to maximize the monopoly profit (α − q − c) q. The monopoly price is given by
The calculations are straight-forward and therefore omitted. To facilitate the comparison between duopoly and monopoly prices, consider also an intermediary case, namely a hypothetical monopolist that does not allow information-sharing between the two plants. Such a monopolist would set
with E e p = (1/2)(α + µ). The expected monopoly price may be written as
, where the first term equals E e p, i.e. the hypothetical expected monopoly price that would result if the monopolist operated the two plants separately. The second term is the reduction in price due to rationalization following from information pooling. The expected duopoly price is given by
µ. The change in the expected price as a result of the merger may then be decomposed into
The first term is positive and captures the market power effect of the merger, the second is negative and captures the effect of rationalization. Depending on the circumstances, either effect can dominate. More precisely:
Proposition 1 A merger raises the expected price if the cost variability (uncertainty) is small enough, σ 2 < 2 9
(α − µ) 2 . However, if costs vary sufficiently, a merger without synergies may reduce the expected price.
The proof is relegated to Appendix A. The first part of the Proposition corresponds to Farrell's and Shapiro's result (1990, Proposition 2) . In particular, if there is no uncertainty, the present model is a special case of Farrell's and Shapiro's model, and a merger will always raise the (expected) price. The second part of Proposition 1 is proved by an example. It shows that Farrell and Shapiro's Proposition 2 does not apply to incomplete information markets. To better understand the relation between Farrell and Shapiro's results and mine, note that the market induces less rationalization under incomplete than under complete information. When a firm has high costs, it plans a small output. Under complete information, competitors anticipate this and expand their output which, in turn, reduces residual demand to the high-cost firm. Consequently, a high-cost firm also tends to meet a low residual demand, and is thus induced to reduce output even further. Such market induced rationalization cannot occur if costs are private knowledge. Thus, in asymmetric information markets, a merger may generate an additional cost reduction gain and hence, a price reduction gain, due to pooling of information.
In markets with fluctuating costs, the price also fluctuates, and consumer welfare cannot be viewed as a function of the price level only; price variability is also important. In the present model a merger decreases price variability, as demonstrated in Appendix B. Essentially, the reason is that the variability of the duopoly price is determined by the variability of the sum of the two (independent) costs, while the variability of the monopoly price is determined by the variability of one cost only. Since consumer utility typically is increasing in price fluctuations, the effect of merger on price variability makes it less attractive for consumers.
In some cases consumers prefer stable prices, however. The coefficient of relative price risk aversion is in the present context, where the income elasticity of demand is zero, given by ρ p ≡ ε − s · ρ m , where ε is the price elasticity of demand, s is the expenditure share, and ρ m is the coefficient of relative income risk aversion (Turnovsky, Shalit, and Schmitz, 1980) . Consequently, the price risk-aversion can be decomposed into two effects: the "substitution effect" corresponding to ε and the "risk effect" corresponding to sρ m . If demand slopes downward, the substitution effect makes consumers favorable to price risk, since they buy a large quantity when the price is low and a small quantity when the price is high. Hence, they might buy the same expected amount as under stable prices, but at a lower expected expenditure (price times quantity). The second effect makes (income) risk-averse consumers also dislike price risk, since variations in the price create variations in real income, in proportion to the expenditure share, and that such income variations are evaluated according to income risk preferences. Consequently, the net effect is ambiguous. Actually, if consumers are sufficiently risk-averse (toward income risk), and if the expenditure share of the commodity is sufficiently large, a merger increases expected consumer welfare by reducing price variability, independent of the effect on the price level.
Robustness
The results are derived in the simplest possible model, thus relying on clearly unrealistic assumptions. The main conclusion of the paper, that mergers in imperfectly competitive markets with private cost information may generate an efficiency gain associated with the pooling of information and that this efficiency gain is partly passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices is more general, however. For the sake of concreteness, it may be instructive to think of the industry as hydroelectric power generation.
In the model, calculations are simplified by assuming that the costs distributions of the two plants are independent both before and after the merger. In real markets, however, costs are often positively correlated, since a part of the variation is due to variations in the prices of inputs that both plants consume. In hydroelectric power generation, cost variations are partly due to variations in rainfall, which may be common to the two plants if they are located in the same region. One should also expect the correlation to increase as result of merger, e.g. since procurement of inputs may be centralized. The plant specific elements may still be substantial after merger, however, e.g. as a result of differences in location and production techniques. Allowing for positive and increasing correlation would reduce the strength of the mechanism, but not eliminate it completely.
The second basic modeling assumption is that cost information is private to the firms. In reality, however, firms may partly predict their competitors cost levels using many different types of information. When there is positive correlation in costs, firms may use their own costs to predict their competitors' costs. Also firm specific cost variations may partly be publicly observable. Electricity firms may for example use information about the rainfall in different regions. Moreover, the competitors' own choices of quantities and prices disclose some of their private cost information. Despite such information leakage, large uncertainties often remain. In particular, short term variations in cost may not be revealed as competitors' prices and quantities are not observed instantaneously. This is evidenced by information sharing agreements that exist between different operators in the industry. For example, before the introduction of the new electricity exchange in the Nordic countries, the electricity producers in Sweden were for a long time allowed a far reaching information sharing agreement to allocate production between power plants to take full advantage of short-term variations in marginal costs (see for example Bergman et al, 1994) . Information about marginal costs was exchanged hour by hour. It is this type of short term cost variability that the model is intended to capture.
It should also be pointed out that the criteria in the Proposition 1 are given in terms of the mean and variance of the a priori cost distribution. The reason for why merger policy should be based on such ex ante information rather than specific cost realizations, in the present context, is that the model is intended to capture short term cost variations.
Note also that I have not allowed independent firms in the model to exchange information even though this possibility is used in many industries, including electricity generation. Moreover, the information-sharing literature has previously shown that oligopoly firms often do have incentives to share information and that information sharing does not entail any anticompetitive effects and, hence, that such schemes may increase social welfare (for a review, see Vives 1999) . Based on these results, one may even argue that information pooling efficiencies should not be a defense for horizontal mergers since similar gains can be achieved with less harm to competition.
There are counter-arguments to this view, however. First, information exchange does not induce as much rationalization as a full merger (i.e. high cost firms continue to produce). Second, it is often said that if information sharing is allowed, the cooperative spirit may spill over to pricing decisions. And, just to mention one example, the Swedish competition authority did only allow the information-sharing agreement between electricity firms to continue for three years following the introduction of the new Swedish competition act. Thus, the possibility to share information also calls for an explicit analysis of collusion. It has already been shown that collusion in conjunction with information sharing, under certain conditions, is equivalent to a merger (Athey and Bagwell, 2001; Stennek, 1994) . 2 In this context, the present paper indicates that information pooling may not only provide an efficiency defense for mergers but also for cartels.
To simplify calculations it is assumed that plants produce at constant marginal cost. As a result, the monopolist will allocate all production to a single plant in every period. Under the more realistic assumption that marginal costs are increasing and that the monopolist would operate both plants in every period, the strength of the mechanism described here would be reduced. Qualitative conclusions remain, however. Similarly, if there is some product differentiation, the importance of rationalization is reduced.
Including n ≥ 3 (one-plant) firms tends to make mergers more attractive. The change in expected price as a result of one two-firm merger is given by
n .
Note that both the anti-competitive effect (the first term) and the information pooling effect (the second term) are smaller the larger is the number of firms. Since the anti-competitive effect is reduced at a larger rate, the information pooling effect is relatively more important the more firms there are.
3
The present paper considers Cournot oligopoly. In a Bertrand oligopoly, competition is typically tougher and mergers are more anti-competitive. Moreover, even though mergers may generate efficiency gains related to information pooling also in Bertrand oligopoly, they are likely to be less important than in Cournot competition. 4 Even if the information pooling effects are not sufficient to completely offset the anti-competitive effects of a merger, they should still not be neglected. 3 The information pooling gain is also important for the firms' own incentives to merge. Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) show that firms' incentives to merge in Cournot oligopoly are weak, since the "insiders" contraction of output triggers an expansive reaction by the "outsiders." However, Salant et al. only consider non-stochastic and symmetric constant returns to scale technologies, and in effect neglect that a merger might reduce costs. Naturally, a cost reduction yields an immediate increase in profits. Consider the extension of the model to the case with 3 one-plant firms, and consider a merger between two firms. In the case of a two-point distribution for plant cost with pr {c = 1} = pr {c = 0} = 1/2, and α = 1, then µ = 1/2, σ 2 = 1/4, µ = 1/4, and σ 2 = 3/16, which produces a net gain of 1/576. In Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) two firms never have the incentive to merge, unless they in the outset form a duopoly and hence completely monopolize the market. 4 If goods are homogenous and firms are ex ante identical, Bertrand markets may actually induce efficient allocation of production, even when costs are private information. The reason is that all customers go to the firm with the lowest price and that firms' prices are increasing functions of their own cost realizations. For example, in the case of inelastic demand and costs uniformly distributed on [c L , c H ], firms charge
Thus, only the lowest cost firm produces in equilibrium.
Conclusions
The economic literature provides several arguments why competition authorities should balance the anti-competitive effects of mergers against their efficiency gains. Williamson (1968) uses a cost-benefit analysis to show that horizontal mergers may increase social welfare if they save on costs. Farrell and Shapiro (1990) study merger in a Cournot model and show that consumers may also gain, if the merger generates cost synergies. The economic literature also provides practical tools for making the trade-off between anticompetitive effects and efficiency gains, such as simulation analysis (Werden and Froeb, 1994; Ivaldi and Verboven, 2001 ) and econometric techniques to estimate the pass-on of firm-specific cost savings (Ashenfelter, Ashmore, Baker and McKerman, 1998) .
The economic analysis in this field has had some impact on policy. Today, several merger control systems in the OECD allow a so-called efficiency defense, an example of which is the US with its Federal Merger Guidelines. The first releases of the Guidelines in 1968 and 1982 opposed efficiency considerations unless under exceptional circumstances. The later releases of the Guidelines in 1984 and 1992 (which is still in use today) reveal a more sympathetic treatment of efficiency claims. In Europe, the Commission acknowledges the importance of efficiencies when assessing joint ventures and other agreements under Article 81 of the Treaty of Rome. Merger policy, on the other hand, is still unclear as concerns the role of efficiencies (Röller, Stennek and Verboven, 2001 ).
The present paper demonstrates the importance of a set of previously neglected circumstances when assessing the effects of horizontal mergers. In markets where firms' costs are private information, mergers generate efficiency gains associated with pooling of information. Since information is generally imperfect, and may often be very limited, these extensions seem to be of importance for a complete assessment of mergers. However, to take these gains into account, it is necessary to actually assess the degree to which cost shocks are idiosyncratic and to what extent information is private. As is always the case with the efficiency defense, the firms' ability to clearly demonstrate the efficiency gains to antitrust authorities may in practice be limited. The second-order statistic c ≡ max {c 1 , c 2 } has density f (c) = 2F (c) f (c). The mean is denoted by µ and the variance by σ 2 .
Lemma 2
Proof.
To see (i): 
Lemma 3
(ii) µ − µ < 1 2 √ 2σ 2 .
To see ( 
Proof of the first part of the Proposition
To see this, first note that the price is increased if, and only if, µ − µ < (α − µ) /3. Second, use the fact that µ−µ < 1 2 √ 2σ 2 as is shown in Appendix A, Lemma 3.
Proof of the second part of the Proposition
To prove the second part of the proposition, consider an example where uncertainty is large. The cost is either high c = 1 or low c = 0. The probability of a high cost is π = 3/4. Let α = 5/4. With a two-point distribution, the price is either high (when (c 1 + c 2 ) /2 = 1), medium (when (c 1 + c 2 ) /2 = 1/2), or low (when (c 1 + c 2 ) /2 = 0). The associated probabilities are π 2 = 9/16, 2π (1 − π) = 6/16, and (1 − π) Note that firms produce non-negative output in equilibrium since 1 ≤ 10/12 + 3/12, ie c H ≤ 2α/3 + µ/3.
B Price Variability
Since prices are linear in costs, monopoly price variability is var {p m } = (∂p m /∂c) 2 var {c} = 1 4 σ 2 ,
